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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TIIE STATE OF UTAH 
DENISC R. GRN1ME, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. case No. 15420 
ANDRE GRAMME, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff, Denise R. Gramme, filed an action in 
divorce. Defendant, Andre Gramme, answered and counter-
claimed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial court found that the plaintiff was 
entitled to a divorce against the Defendant and awarded 
the Defendant a divorce against the Plaintiff on the 
counterclaim. The Trial court awarded the Plaintiff real 
and personal property having a value in excess of 
$200,000.00, assessed attorney's fees of $8,000.00, awarded 
costs, and required the Defendant to pay, as permanent 
alimony, the sum of $1,400.00 per month. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant-Appellant asks the court to 
eliminate or reduce the prov1·s1"on for a1·m l ony' to modify 
the property .:!Wu.rd, and to require thcit the Pl<:lintiff-
Respondent pay, from her substantial estate, her own attor-
ney's fees and costs. The Defendant requests that the 
home in Carmel, california, be sold and that the proceeds 0, 
placed in trust and professionally managed for the Plain ti:' 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
while the court on this appeal may review the 
law and the facts, the Defendant has divided the statemer.t 
of Facts in three parts, the last of which is entirely 
financial. The first section concerns the testimony of 
the plaintiff, Denise R. Gramme, insofar as it is germane 
to the issues· raised by the Defendant on appeal. The facts 
contained there are not in dispute. In that section, the 
Defendant has included, for ease of reference, however, the 
third party testimony of Dean R. cal lister, the arson in-
vestigator of the salt Lake city Fire Department. The 
second section includes the testimony of the Defendant, 
Andre Grarrune. 
Testimony, Denise R. Gramme 
The plaintiff had six years of elementary school 
in Belgium and three years of high school for a total of 
. ( 173) Her employment nine years formal education R. . 
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prior to her marriage was with her father, in the potato 
business, also in Belgium, where she worked sporadically 
some Limes "all the we: ck" and sometimes not ut all. She 
learned, she said, to buy potatoes and groceries, to bag, 
carry and deliver potatoes (R. 174). 
The parties were married in 1946 and the plain-
tiff became immediately pregnant with their only child, 
Arlette Gramme Rukavina. The plaintiff was not employed 
until 1949, when, after emigrating to America, she commenced 
employment with the Hotel Utah (R. 175), after which she 
held a number of different jobs. Her last employment was 
with L. G. Balfour and was for "close to a year" or "maybe 
more" (R. 176). she was working for Balfour in 1966 
(R. 177). 
Everything, the plaintiff testified, was perfect, 
between she and the Defendant, until he established a 
relationship with one Sharon Morecraft in the latter part 
of September 1975 (R. 167-168). The plaintiff was, prior 
to that time, "everything" to the Defendant, she said. He 
was never ashamed of her, took her out all the time, 
spoiled her and dressed and treated her beautifully 
(R. 163-164). she had, however, she admitted, been hospi-
talized between January 15, 1969, and September 4, 1975, 
twelve times. The records show that the enrollments were 
frequently for psychological rather than physical reasons 
(Exhibit 37-D). 
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The Plaintiff had a mastectomy in 1969 · 
, tor a 
malignant tumor and her left breast was removed (R. 
2201
. 
Her medical problem was equivalent to that of Mrs. Jake c-. 
""· 
Happy Rockefeller and Betty Ford (R. 215). The Plaintiff 
later requested the removal of her right breast. There 
was, when it was removed, no hint of malignancy. The 
plaintiff has never had chemotherapy, or radiation, w a~ 
medication related to the treatment of cancer. No doctor 
has presently advised her that she suffers from cancer 
(R. 221), or has in the nine years since 1969 (R. 222). 
She is under no current course of treatment for the disease. 
The plaintiff had a hysterectomy early in her married life 
and has had a bladder problem. 
The plaintiff, prior to the trial, had had house· 
hold help for ten or twelve years taking care of one half 
of a duplex at 692 cortez street in salt Lake city, utah, 
where she was home, basically all of the time (R. 214). 
The duplex on Cortez street in which the parties lived 
from 1953 to late 1975, and where the Defendant continues 
to reside, cost less than $10,000.00 to build and the 
companion unit rented for $85.00 a month (R. 169) · rn 
1975, the parties purchased an expensive home in carmel, 
california. 
The plaintiff, during the period of her married 
life, had fainting episodes, which sometimes resembled 
-4-
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convulsions. The fainting spells preceded, by a consider-
able period, the surger7 for the removal of the left breast, 
and there were many such incidents (R. 182-183). Mrs. Gramme 
did not know how many times she had passed out during the 
marriage, whether forty-five or fifty, to which she had 
admitted earlier, or four or five hundred times. she knew, 
however, that it was "many, many, many times" both before 
and after her admission for the removal of her left breast 
on January 15, 1969 (R. 183). such seizures never occurred 
while she was operating an appliance. once, she said, one 
occurred while she was operating a motor vehicle and twice, 
she said, they occurred in a public place (R. 184-185). 
She was never admitted to any hospital for injuries sus-
tained as a result of such circumstances. ouring the trial, 
she appeared, on one occasion, to fall around the witness 
box and to the floor (R. 281). 
The plaintiff testified that there was a fire at 
her home on July 4, 1972, and another that preceded it 
(R. 188-189). yet a third fire involved a 1970 Pontiac 
owned by the parties and was caused by arson (R. 192). A 
fourth fire at the Gramme residence involved a boat owned 
by the Plaintiff's father which was stored in the carport 
at the plaintiff's home while the father was in Europe. 
It burned the boat, damaged a camper, a truck and the car-
port (See Exhibits 47-o to 50-o) and caused extensive dam-
age (R. 195). 
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The Plaintiff ad;nitced that a :-iei,=:hi)or :;ir~ ,_ 
accused her of setting ~ fire, cl~iming to be an e~:e\·1:.. ::.~::: 
(R. 197). She indicated that the witnesses :-iame 
Knolte (R. 198), and that, later, the Knolte home ca~:;:,: 
on fire (R. 199). Mrs. Gramme, in connection with :::e 
accusation, spoke to the "fire chief" at his office bu: 
testified, at first (R. 201-202), that it was not che Fi:; 
Department, but the Defendant who required her co see 
psychiatrist (R. 201). She denied she was ever asked :c :; 
a lie detector test concerning these events, and ther. 
(R. 202). 
Dean P. Callister, a Lieutenant in the Salt L~! 
City Fire Department, the fire arson investigator, tes'.:i· 
fied from Fire Department records (R. 483), that he was 
familiar with the parties and had been called to their he:.! 
at 692 Cortez street to investigate fires on six separate 
occasions between -"'lay of 197 3, and June of 1974. The'; ~,a: 
involved, among other things, a garage, a fence, a :::aqor:, 
boat, truck and camper, and a grass fire (R. 482). .:..f:er' 
number of visits to examine the aftermath of fires belie"·": 
to have been caused by arson, without being able, from tr.e 
evidence, to prove guilt, the Lieutenant was called to 
speak with "two witnesses" who informed him "they had 
observed Mrs. Gramme" set a fire (R. 488). After speak:.~= 
with the county Attorney, who advised him to speak with::: 
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r;ra;:-Ll!leS, :ie informed them, he said, on June 25, 1974, that 
:hey ~ust obtain care fer the Plaintiff or that the cepart-
~c~t would file criminal charges against her (R. 489). 
sieucenant callisccr later confirmed that th~ plaintiff 
was, pursuant to his instructions, receiving psychiatric 
:are (R. 490). The fire in June of 1974, was the last one 
:r.e Fire Department was called to investigate at the Plain-
:iff' s home (R. 488). The plaintiff, at the time, was 
admitted co the psychiatric ward at St. _:,rark's Hospital 
(R. 272). 
On three or four occasions, windows were broken at 
Cortez Street (R. 202). The home was burglarized and jewel-
ry was stolen. The Defendant's office was ransacked "two" 
or "three" times, and his papers and documents were thrown 
aro1.lnd (R. 203). The Police, as distinguished from the Fire 
Jepartment, came to the parties home at least two or three 
times (R. 204). All of the events described preceded the 
relationship of the Defendant with Mrs. Morecraft (R. 206). 
The Plaintiff had used drugs, she said, regularly, 
since 1969. They cost her, over nine years, $60.00 to 
$70.00 per month, "sometimes more, sometimes less" (R. 207). 
The drugs included valium,. Fiornal and Diuril (R. 208). 
water pills, and also, Thorazine and Equamil (R. 291). The 
Plaintiff overdosed on drugs and when asked how often, 
responded as follows: 
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"Well, my husband told me every 
time I took those pills he took me 
down to the h<::lspital, and r recall 
three or four times, maybe six times 
I don't know. Maybe three or four o~ 
five times, I guess" (R. 209). 
some of the drug overdoses w0re, in reality, 
suicide attempts (R. 210), and of the twelve hospital ad-
missions, for every purpose, surgical and psychological, 
from January of 1969, to September of 1975, all, again, 
were prior to the relationship of the Defendant with sharor, 
Morecraft (R. 211, Exhibit 37-o). Prior to the Defendant's 
friendship with Sharon Morecraft, in late 1975, the Plain-
tiff admitted that she had never complained that her husbar.d, 
Andre Gramme, ~ any part of her problem (R. 213-214). rhe 
psychiatrist noted on July 11, 1974, on the occasion of 
the plaintiff's tenth admission to St. Mark's Hospital, tha: 
her social history was "insignificant" (Exhibit 37-D, 
July 11, 1974 admission, emphasis supplied). 
The plaintiff physically assaulted Sharon More-
craft at the airport (R. 231-232), in 1975 or 1976, beating 
her with a club she had brought from home, which was broken 
k ( 232 235) The Plaintiff admit· on Mrs. Morecraft's bac R. - . 
· d h scared of me," and ted that the Defendant sai " .•. e was 
that he slept in the bathroom, behind the locked door, 
"many, many, many times" (R. 236). 
The plaintiff was accused of theft (R. 297) in 
carmel, California, in early 1977, involving expensive 
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jewelry stolen from the home of Dr. and Mrs. Hall, who were 
friends. rt was the Plaintiff who notified the police of 
a robbery, ostensibly in process. There were, again, broken 
11indows, and the jewelry was found, after a search, in the 
plaintiff's carmel home. The Plaintiff plcd guilty to a 
misdemeanor and was placed on probation. She was on proba-
tion in California at the time of the trial (R. 297-303). 
Testimony, Andre Granune 
The parties were married in July of 1946. Mrs. 
Grarrune was first employed in late 1949 or early 1950 and 
last worked in 1967 (R. 409), when her income was $1,352.85 
(R. 412). She had no incomP- in 1968, none since 1968, and 
worked sporadically, perha~s half the time, from 1949 to 
1967 (R. 414-415). 
The plaintiff left the Defendant, and her infant 
daughter, early in the marriage (R. 420), for some ten 
days for another man (R. 421). The Plaintiff, the Defendant 
said, had a bad temper and was both nervous and loud. 
The plaintiff had, during the period of the mar-
riage, and before 1969, "hundreds" of fainting incidents, 
which were, said the Defendant, "too numerous to count" 
(R. 421). The plaintiff would, the Defendant said, lapse 
to the floor or fall on a couch. The Defendant never knew 
the Plaintiff to fall against a piece of furniture, or to 
hurt herself, and she was never hospitalized by reason of the 
-9-
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incidents. The Defendant had never known h sue an event :c 
occur when the Plainti£f was operating an appliance, 
bathlub (R. 422), in an automobile, or at a b 
c ny pu lie place 
NO doctor ever found an explanation for sucli · · incidents, "' 
for the variant that more nearly resembled a t ype of conv'l.· 
sion (R. 423). The incident in the witness box, dur~g~ 
trial, was the first such incident the Defendant ever ob-
served to occur in a public place. After the Fire oepart-
men t required the Plaintiff to see a psychiatrist, there 
were, said the Defendant, no more convulsions (R. 424). 
·The plaintiff was a regular drug user, and began 
taking them as early as 1949 or 1950. They included sleep-
ing pills and tranquilizers (R. 425) . The use increased 
in number and variety after 1969 and those for which pay-
ment was made by check cost between $60.00 and $80.00 a 
month, from then until the time of trial. As early as 19iO 
the plaintiff overdosed, on one occasion after an argument 
with her father (R. 426). she did it on several subsequent 
occasions and was hospitalized. on several occasions hu 
stomach was pumped at st. Mark's Hospital (R. 427). 
The plaintiff, the Defendant testified, confined 
herself' for a number of years' to the consideration of her 
health. she stayed at home with the drapes pulled, the 
doors locked, the blinds drawn, failing to dress during the 
day and watching the soap operas on TV. 
She did not assis: 
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in the business (R. 427-428), manage the household accounts 
(R· 467), keep or maintain the duplex and she was, the 
oefendant testified, often up at night (R. 428). 
The Plaintiff was not pleased with the home at 
corLcz and wanLed to move to a larger home in rrolladay 
(R. 429). she had wanted, she testified, to move from the 
duplex to a better place and she had discussed such a move 
with the Defendant over a period of many years (R. 170). 
There were, at Cortez, a "rash" of broken windows. on one 
occasion a detective asked the Defendant if the plaintiff 
would take a lie detector test. rn connection with such 
events, the Plaintiff suggested that the parties move, as-
serting that someone didn't like them and that they must 
have "enemies" (R. 430). 
After one of the ransacking incidents at the home, 
the Defendant observed the plaintiff remove money from his 
wallet (R. 431). The police Department came to the house 
in connection with the broken windows, and the ransackings, 
four or five times (R. 432). The plaintiff refused to take 
the lie detector test on the basis, she said, of medical 
advice (R. 432-433). 
There were four separate fires in the home, at 
Cortez (R. 433). All began in the carport. The second 
occurred on the 4th of July when the Defendant went, over 
-11-
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objection, to a party without the Plaintiff, who then ca'.· 
to inform him that the qarage was on fire (R. 434). 
The third incident involved the burning of a 
1970 Pontiac. The De fcndun t was awakened by the Plaint,:: 
who preceded him outside and who pulled from the gas tan~. 
a rope or a rag that operated as a fuse (R. 435). The 
Defendant found matches at the scene and was told by the 
Plaintiff, who admitted they were there, that it was ~rt 
and that she had lit the matches to see what was going on. 
Before the fire, the Plaintiff had asked that the parties 
purchase another car, a request that the Defendant had re· 
fused (R. 437). The Fire Department investigated, and cor.· 
eluded that the fire was caused by arson (R. 437). 
In 1973 or 1974, the Plaintiff wanted to travel 
with her parents to Europe to visit an aunt who was dying 
(R. 437), and her parents refused to permit her to accom· 
pany them. During the trip, the father, Mr. Hasoppe, 
stored his boat at Cortez street in the carport. The De· 
fendant, one evening, waked, after an explosion, to find 
the boat on fire and his wife on the-couch in the livi~ 
room. The fire, which spread, engulfed the carport, a 
truck and its contents, items of storage, as well as the 
boat and all were destroyed or damaged, reflecting a total 
loss of approximately $10,000.00 (R. 739), equivalent~ 
the original cost for the construction of the entire dupl:: 
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rhe Fire Department determined that the fire was caused 
by arson (R. 440). It was the fourth fire at the duplex 
on curtcz str~ct. 
Th'-'rc w'-'rc, in <..tddition to the fires at the home 
of the parties, other fires in the neighborhood. Two of 
them involved fences, one a grapestake, between the home 
of neighbors to the north, the Knolte's, and the home of 
the parties to these proceedings (R. 441). One of them 
also involved a clutch of bamboo which the plaintiff had 
complained blew dry leaves on the parties' property in the 
late fall or early winter (R. 441-442). on another occasion 
the Defendant was awakened by the Fire Department which had 
extinguished a grass fire. It was at that time, that the 
setting of the fire, by the Plaintiff, was witnessed by 
neighbors (R. 442). Later there was at the home of the 
Knolte's, the parents of one of the witnesses, though they 
no longer lived at the premises, also a fire (R. 443). 
The parties were summoned to the Fire Department 
(R. 443) and told by the arson investigator that there was 
enough evidence to press charges against the Plaintiff un-
less she had psychiatric treatment (R. 444). The Plaintiff 
was enrolled at the psychiatric ward at st. Mark's Hospital 
on two separate and subsequent occasions, once after an 
overdose (R. 445) on the request of Dr. Peterson, and once 
•Jpon the request of the family physician, Dr. Dalyrymple, 
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"for a total period of approximately two weeks 
A second psychiatrist r~commended a 
the filing of the criminal charoes in ~a1i=orr·~ __ . ~ -- _..... ··---, .:::i' ... ::s::~.~· 
to the filing of this lawsuit. The Pl.ai:1t:i~£ re::.isei 
admitted (R. 446-448). 
The Defendant testified that the condu.ct of :~, 
Plaintiff impaired their social relationships (R. 452, 
on one occasion, he found her in a closed garage, :..:: :.~: 
trur..k of the car, with its motor running (R. 4531. s~e '" 
taken, again, to the emergency room at st. Mark's 5:tos~n:a: 
Twice the Defendant found the plaintiff standing over ~u 
bed with a knife in her hand (R. 454) , and once he four.d 
her wandering around the house, after an argi.:men'::, wit'.1 a 
rifle, cocked, a shell in the chamber, and •.nth the sa:e: 
off (R. 455) . The Defendant also testified that because 
he was afraid of the plaintiff, he would lock himself i;. 
the bathroom ar..d sleep on the floor. He believed, he sa:: 
that the plaintiff was capable of physical violence (R. •:: 
He observed the plaintiff hit Mrs. Morecraft with a brae~· 
stick, beat her with her hands and throw her luggage ai: ::; 
airport (R. 456). on a morning after the plaintiff had 
physically attempted to gain ingress to the Defendant's 
apartment, the Defendant was advised that a corvair auto· 
mobile dri,ren by Mrs. Morecraft, had been damaged by so!l:ec:' 
who had apparently struck the vehicle with a rock, scrat::: 
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;lass o:-. a 
.=:.::e .::.:;er: :'.. -l-56). 
··~r:: r·:;la::.o:-.ship of c.he Jcf~r.da:-:t '.Vi1:h ~·!rs. ~lore­
~..-'.::-- · .. ;as ~~o:., :.~-.e. ::'2£2r..dar:.~ ~estif.i.ed, secr·2::. or ::lan-
:::s::.r~c ". . .+581. Tr.c Defendant admitted he knew Sharon 
c·'.or:ecraf::, that he had a relationship with her which began 
•. ~c ·:if 1975 (R. 102) and that they had been to san 
::.e:;c •.?- • .+·J1' to san carlos, :-1exico, ~[azatlan, ~exico 
o.r.i c:ar:rel, califor:na (R. 531 together (R. 41). He admit-
:ed tha:: c·lr:S. c·lorecraft worked for him in his office (R. 42), 
::'.at: :ie had given her gifts, and had seen her frequently, 
~ot'.1 prior ::o and after his separation from the Plaintiff 
(:.:<. 46) in September of 1976 (R. 47). He stated that the 
?lainciff was in California quite a bit of the time, just 
?rior to their separation (R. 49). 
The Plaintiff, the Defendant testified, was a 
?OOr manager of money; and, at times, during the period of 
'.:er emplo~·ment, her clothing purchases were virtually equiv-
alent ::o her income. Her tastes were expensive (R. 469). 
;fter t~e separation of the parties, the Plaintiff, though 
the recipient of adequate temporary alimony, failed to pay 
~er bills in timely fashion, including telephone, garbage 
?ic:-:up, soft water, cable TV and water (R. 477). 
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Financial Affairs 
The Defendant., a masonry contractor, testified 
that all of his carninss from every source had 
come to res: 
in his personal assets, as reflected in the exhibit, 34_0, 
(R. 105-106) and in the value of his corporation, which he 
testified was, as of December 31, 1976, $120,000.00, and 
which, he testified, had diminished in view of his losses 
during the year 1977 (R. 501). The Defendant failed to 
answer several questions pertaining to his income, his pur-
chases, and to the accumulations in his estate prior~~: 
He did so on the basis of the privilege against self incric· 
ination. The questions and the objections are on the recor' 
at 85, 86, 89 and 90. The parties accountant, Mr. Bayes, 
who had, for many years, prepared their joint returns, 
testified that he knew of no other assets (R. 545), as did, 
essentially, the plaintiff. There were several items whid 
the Defendant admitted in final argument (R. 621) might 
operate to increase the figure on Exhibit 34-D, slightly.
1 
The Trial court found the value of the personal assets to 
be $439,200.00, and valued the corporation at $210,800.00 
(Find in gs, R . at 124) . That was some $ 90, 000. 00 more than 
1. rncluding $1, 700.00 for improvements at 1815 west SOO 
south, $1,400.00 for the cash value of the policy.of ~l~ 
insurance with Northwestern, and a oatsun automobile 
at $2,500.00. (see: Final Argument at 620-621.) 
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it was valued by its accountant (R. 555), or by the Defend-
ant, without considering the loss8s incurred in the year 
1977. 
The Defendant, who testified at the trial that 
the position of the corporation, Andre Gramme Masonry, rnc., 
was "very precarious," said that he had borrowed $160,000.00, 
some of which was secured by savings certificates, to secure 
operating capital, cash flow, for the business (R. 493-495). 
The Defendant also presented a projection of the project 
at Little America, showing an estimated loss of $120,000.00 
(R. 497), and other projected losses that raised the 
anticipated shortfall for 1977 to $150,000.00 (R. 501). 
The Defendant stood behind his tax returns that reflected 
a loss in 1976 (R. 501). 
The valuation placed on the corporation by the 
Plaintiff's expert was exorbitant (R. 314). The Trial 
court did not authenticate the expert's findings and 
expressly refused to award the Plaintiff a fee for the 
expert's services. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT MISUNDERSTOOD AND MISAPPLIED THE LAW 
A. The court Below Did Not consider the Mis-
conduct of the plaintiff Wife. 
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The Trial court :::onsistently resisted c:::s :c·-
--:.: 
sideration of the facts. relating t:o the misconduct a::·, 
'.vife, treating the case as one involving merel/ ~:ic; a::.:·. 
mcnt of economic filccors. The problem surfaced 
off the record, before the trial began. 2 Defendant's 
counsel requested, first in chambers, during the course c: 
the trial, and then in open court, that the court arc1:·;. 
late its position on the record (R. 526-528). 
Defendant's counsel interrogated the Plainti:: 
relative to several actual or attempted physical assaub 
by the plaintiff on Mrs. Morecraft and members of the 
plaintiff's family. The questions were asked on cross-
examination, and the first question in the series began a: 
line 3 on page 231. Objections were interposed to a 
foundational question which began at line 11 on page ~O. 
2. 
"MR. ALLRED 
MR. MC LACHIJl.N : 
THE COURT: 
MR. ALLRED: 
Mrs. Gramme, you were 
on the outs with your 
father for a period of 
some years, were you not, 
before his death (R. 240)? 
your Honor, I will object 
to this line of questionir.g. 
I can't see any relevance. 
objection is sustained. 
okay. Mrs. Gramme, were 
you excluded from your 
father's room at the hos-
pital? 
where the court invited objections to such testimony. 
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MR. ;•!C U\CHLAN: 
THE WITNi:SS: · 
:'!R. Y!C LACHLAN : 
t-!R. )\LLRED: 
THE COURT: 
~1R . ALLRED : 
THE COURT: 
MR. AL:!:.,RED: 
THE COURT: 
Your Honor- -
Never, Sir. 
Your Honor- -
I'm laying the groundwork, 
Your Honor, for the attack 
that I have just mentioned. 
All right. Suppose you 
show the attack? 
Excuse me? 
suppose you show that? 
What then? what does it 
prove so far as this case 
is concerned? 
The conduct of the wife, 
Your Honor, the misconduct 
of the wife. 
Objection is sustained ... " 
(R. 240-241) (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
Then followed a lengthy legal argument. During 
that argument, the following discussion was had. 
MR. ALLRED: 
THE COURT: 
" ... But r'm not trying to 
confine myself to misconduct 
of recent origin (R. 244). 
well r'm going to confine 
misconduct to recent origin, 
and in that regard, recommend 
strongly you read English v 
English,3 which was decided 
by the utah supreme court 
.on June 2nd, 1977. 
3. Where this court addressed itself to economic con-
siderations. English v. English ~utah, ·1977), 565 P.2d 
409. 
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:'<IR. ALLRED : 
THE COURT: 
I have read it, Your Ho~o" 
I h~ve got a photocopy i:c-· 
my rile. 
Does that tell vou an]'thi~.: 
about what the issues ir. -
this case are?" (R. ~44 
emphasis supplied)4 ' 
In that dialogue, the court ha ·d · s sai , indirec:: 
on the record, what it had said, more directly, in chamber; 
Al'imony, the court reasoned, was to be determined witJ 
reference to the economic factors and was, in the insta:ic 
case, in its entirety, an economic judgment. 
That that was the position of the Trial court 
is apparent in the dialogue between the court and Defend· 
ant's counsel (R. 240-268). The court sustained the 
objection to the question with which the dialogue began, 
relying, it said, on the "precise language" (R. 268) of 
Anderson v. Anderson 18 utah 2d 286, 422 P.2d 192, which 
it claimed supported the proposition that grounds for 
4. Misconduct was not at issue in the English case, as 
the plaintiff-Respondent noted in her brief. "In the 
instant matter there is nothing that reflects upon the 
morality of either party ..• " (Respondent's Brief, page 19 
rn English this court cited as central to its delibera-
tions on the issue of alimony, Hendricks v. Hendricks 
91 utah 553, 63 p.2d 277, a 1936 utah case that prec~~ 
Alldredge v. Alldredge 119 Utah 504, 229 p.2d 681'. _by 
some fifteen years in time. The English case mod1ned 
and reduced the alimony awarded by the Trial court. 
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divorce having been established, the degree of fault was 
of no further concern to the Trial Judge. 5 
The Trial court articulated its position, first, 
in the context of a quote from the Anderson case, stating 
"Thus it affirmatively appears that 
he (th~ Trial Judge in the Anderson case) 
did not penalize the Plaintiff in that 
regard, but considered the various fac-
tors bearing upon their financial situa-
tion and an equitable solution to the 
problems presented by the attorneys" 
(R. 268-269). 
and then Judge Hanson put the matter, in perspective, in 
his own words, as follows: 
5. rn the Anderson case, the Trial court agreed to be 
bound by a stipulation. The arrangement w~s reflected in 
the brief on appeal as follows: 
"The parties stipulated that the 
court would consider the division of the 
property without in any way consider~ 
the question ~ grounds of divorce £E_ 
who was responsible, to which the court 
stated that it thought this was a whole-
some way of handling the matter (R. 54)" 
(Appellant's Brief, page 5, emphasis 
supplied). 
The Appellant urged on the Anderson appeal that the Trial 
court disregarded the stipulation and considered marital 
fault and misconduct in making its award. This court said 
that the Trial court in Anderson did not disregard the 
arrangement of the parties. The Trial court, in the instant 
case, took the language of this court in the Anderson case, 
out of context, failing to consider the effect of the , 
Stipulation, and erroneously assumed, as a general proposi-
tion, that once grounds for divorce were established, 
the degree of fault was of no further concern. 
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"WHICII I THINK REFLECTS THE LAW 
OF THIS STATE AS FURTHER SET FORTH 
IN THE CASE (English v. English, supra 
R. at 241) I WAS REFERRING TO EARLIER° 
'l'fHS MORNING" (R. 269, emphasis 
supplied) . 
The court permitted, begrudgingly, testimony 
concerning the Plaintiff's misconduct during the marriage, 
but clearly, as the preceding quote indicates, did not 
consider it on the issue of alimony, and permitted its 
admission for the limited purpose of cross-examination, 
or confined it to the issue of grounds. 6 
B. The Position of the Trial court Did Not 
correctly Reflect the Law of the state of Utah. 
courts justify the award of permanent alimony 
on differing theories. some take the position that it is 
in the nature of compensation for the wrong and injury a 
wife has suffered by reason of her husband's misconduct. 
EX parte Spencer 83 cal. 460, 23 P. 395. see also: M 
Am Jur 2d, "Divorce and separation," § 601, p. 725. The 
generally accepted view, however, is that the function of 
permanent alimony is to provide support for the wife. 
strictly speaking, permanent alimony is not based upon the 
obligation of support, since the dissolution of the 
6. see instances on the record, line 1 page 419 to line 
3 page 240, line 15 to line 23 at page 281. line B to 
line 11 at page 451, line 15 to line 17 at page 454. 
-22-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
marriage by the final decr2e terminates such obligation. 
Rather, it is a substi~ute for the right of support. 
where the court has the power to award permanent 
alimony, the question whether it should be allowed in the 
particular case is a matter of sound judicial discretion 
to be exercised with reference to established principles 
and upon a view of all the circumstances of the particular 
case.
7 Stefonick v. Stefanick 118 Mont. 486, 167 P.2d 848, 
Bishop v. Bishop 194 Okla. 209, 148 P.2d 472, 155 ALR 604, 
Miles v. Miles 185 or. 230, 202 P.2d 485. A wife is never 
entitled to alimony as a matter of course. Vig:il v. vis:il 
49 Colo. 156, 111 P. 833, Tobin v. Tobin 89 Okla. 12, 
213 p. 884. Alimony is usually, but not necessarily, 
awarded to the wife when she is granted a divorce. where 
a divorce is granted to both parties, alimony may be 
7. Assuming the existence of the power to award alimony 
to a wife for whose misconduct a divorce is granted, the 
nature of her conduct is a factor which is taken into 
account in determining whether to make an award. see: 
Annotation: 34 ALR 2d 345, section 11, citing in support 
Macoonald v. MacDonald 120 utah 573, 263 P.2d 1066. 
"The power to award alimony to the 
guilty wife is addressed to the discretion 
of the courts and should be exercised with 
great care, and it should not be exercised 
in favor of the wife where there are no 
mitigating circumstances." 24 Arn Jur 2d, 
"Divorce and separation," section 621 
p. 743. see also: Ecker v. Ecker 22 Okla. 
873, 98 P. 918. 
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awarded either, for the ba · f i· sis o iability sub 
' J ec t to som, 
modification in Utah, is the gran~i·ng f 
o a divorce aga. 
ms: 
the person required to pay it. 8 
Ordinarily, there can be no · J 
Li·' '·"'11ce Of perman-
ent alimony where a Decree of divorce is denied. 
Peyre 79 cal. 336, 21 p. 838. The nat f h 
ure o t e conduct 
of the wife is a factor which is taken in to account in 
determining whether to make an award of alimony.9 Annota-
-tion: 34 ALR 345, section 11. 
The rule at corrunon law, as Justice Wolfe noted 
in Alldredge v. Alldredge 119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681, 
"denied alimony to the wife at fault." 
8. The Utah Rule is widely believed to be as follows: 
" •.. in considering the equities upon 
granting a divorce to the husband, if the 
court finds that the wife has been guilty 
of gross or prolonged irrunoral conduct, an 
award of alimony to the wife may be denied 
in most cases." Alldredge v Alldredge 
119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681. 
see 24 Am Jur 2d, "Divorce and separation," section 621, 
page 744, footnote. see also: Annotation, 34 ALR 2d 345, 
Headnote 7 on page 306. 
9. And indeed the fact that a wife who is granted a 
divorce was not free from fault is always an important 
factor to be taken into consideration in fixing the amount 
of alimony. see: Annotation 9 ALR 2d 1029, section 3. 
I f the wife is free from blame, the allowance will be b d's greater than if her conduct was conducive to her hus an 
fault. see: Annotation: 1 ALR 3d 143, section 6. 
-24-
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In Alldredge, the wife permitted juvenile de-
linquents and older persons of questionable character to 
come to the home. They drank intoxicating liquors, smoked 
cigarettes and played cards over the repeated objections 
of the husband. The Plaintiff and the Defendant had a 
thirty-seven year marriage and eleven children, ten of 
whom survived. The court concluded that the misconduct was 
of only recent origin and that it constituted cruelty which 
did not rise to the level of gross misconduct. The mis-
conduct did not, the court determined, involve moral 
turpitude. 
On those difficult facts, this court, under its 
equitable powers, accepted what it called a more modern 
rule. The court should consider all the circumstances, it 
said, and withhold or decree alimony and distribute prop-
erty in accordance with those circumstances. The Alldredge 
case is widely cited, is regarded as the applicable Utah 
Law by national commentators (see footnote #8) and is the 
lead case in the annotation found at 34 ALR 2d 305. 
Under the Alldredge rule, the rule at common 
law was modified. under the Alldredge rule, a wife of long 
standing did not forfeit all right to alimony or all 
right to a share in the property because of: 
1. Recent misconduct. 
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2. Nor in cases where the husband may have 
been equally at fault. · 
3. Nor in cases where there was a doubtful 
preponderance aguinst the wife. 
The clear nccrative implicati· 011 of ti' All ~ .e drc~ 
case, however, was that a wife might lose part of her 
to property or alimony in each of the three separate 
situations to which reference is above made. 
"Under this rule, the wife of long 
standing does not forfeit ALL right to 
alimony or a share in the propert·y be-
cause of ... " (Emphasis supplied) 
right 
counsel argues that, at its heart, the Alldr~~ 
case, and subsequent Utah cases, still acknowledge the 
underlying validity of the rule at common law, the rule 
in a majority of jurisdictions. 
"Perhaps such a forfeiture of 
alimony may not be out of proportion 
in the case where a young wife guilty 
of acts of moral turpitude, has oppor-
tunity to start life anew but in a 
case such as this it would be all out 
of proportion" (Alldredge v. Alldredge, 
supra at 685). 
The award, extent and duration of alimony is an 
economic judgment that must consider the needs of the wife 
and the ability of the husband to pay, and a great number 
of other circumstances. 10 rt is not, however, as the 
10. Macoonald v. MacDonald 120 Utah 573, 263 p.2d 
1066. 
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Trial court concluded, merely an economic judgment. There 
are factors beyond the economics of the termination, which 
relate to the granting of such an award, its amount and 
duration, and to the right of the wife to claim such a 
benefit as an incident of the marriage. 
c. The Relative Guilt of the Parties is a 
factor to be considered in Awarding Alimony. 
It is a serious conceptual mistake to presume 
that the wife is entitled to alimony, a claim on the hus-
band's future income, whatever her conduct, and however 
it may have contributed to the destruction of the marriage. 
The Utah rule, as it is stated in the annotation 
at 34 ALR 2d 305, is said to be as follows: 
"Although the statute is broad 
enough to give the court the power to 
award permanent alimony to a wife against 
whom a divorce is granted, it is generally 
held that in determining whether to exer-
cise the power in a particular case the 
court should consider the nature of the 
wife's misconduct." Citing: MacDonald v. 
Macoonald 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
And the rule in Alldredge, which the Trial court 
chose to disregard, was that, 
"In considering these equities 
if the"""""Court finds thatthe wife has 
been guII"t"'.{of grossor prolonged--
ImiiiOral conduct~ward of alimony 
may in most casesbedenied." (Emphasis 
supplie~ ~~~ -
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The standard applied in Utah to determine whetr.e: 
alimony is appropriate,· and in what amount, 
is a flexible 
standard, which has, as a practical matter, much 
- wisdom. 
In Wilson v. Wilson 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977 
(1956), this court stated, 
"We recognize that there is no 
authority in our law for administering 
punitive measures in a divorce judgment, 
and that to do so would be improper. 
except that the court may, and as a 
practical matter invariably does consider 
the relative loyalty or disloyalty of the 
parties to their marriage vows, and their 
relative guilt or innocence in causing 
the break-up of the marriage." 
The court then, speaking of alimony, cites the 
principle that was later recited, per curiam, in Anderson ·1. 
Anderson 18 Utah 2d 286, 422 P.2d 192, (1967) stating as 
follows: 
"The court's responsibility is to 
endeavor to provide a just and equitable 
adjustment of their economic resources 
so that the parties can reconstruct 
their lives on a happy and useful basis. 
rn doing so it is necessary for the court 
to consider in addition to the relative 
guilt or innocence of the-parties, an 
appraisal of all 0£---rhe-attend~nt facts 
and circumstances ... " (Emphasis supplied) 
see also: Wilson v. Wilson 5 utah 2d 79, 296 p.l~ 
977, Pinion v. Pinion 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265, Allenv. 
Allen 109 utah 99, 165 P. 2d 872, Searle v. Searle (Utah, 
1974) 522 P.2d 697. 
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The Trial court and Plaintiff's counsel presumed 
~hat the length of the marriage made alimony, substantial 
permanent alimony, automatic, notwithstanding the Plain-
tiff',; conduct, and notwithstanding the inm1ense award of 
property made to the Plaintiff from the marital estate under 
the terms and conditions of the generous Decree. 
In Christensen v. Christensen 21 Utah 2d 263, 
444 p.2d 511 (1968), the Plaintiff and the Defendant had 
been married for twenty-five years and neither party was 
free from fault with respect to the marriage. The Trial 
Judge, for that, within the purview of his powers, awarded 
the divorce to the Plaintiff husband and provided for a 
lump sum of alimony, $2,400.00, payable at the husband's 
option over two years. The wife appealed and urged that 
"Even if there be fault ~ frailty on the part of the 
wife, the court should keep in mind that if she is placed 
in too serious an economic disadvantage, she may become 
dependent upon others or the public which should be avoided." 
Justice Crockett, speaking for a unanimous court, responded 
as follows: 
"Defendant's argument, carried to 
its conclusion, would mean that whenever 
a marriage has lasted for any considerable 
number of years, the wife would always 
be entitled to permanent alimony. we do 
not regard that as the law. Nor did we 
so intend by the statement in the MacDonald 
case ... " 
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case was 
The position of the Appellants in the ~ 
that the Court., on appeal, should concentrat 
e Or. 
the economic factors to the exclusion of "fault or frail: 
That this court, which refused to increase the award to 
the Defendant-Appellant, did not share that conception. 
is indicated in the following language. 
"As indicated therein, (Macoonald) 
it (duration of marriage) is one of 
the factors to be considered with all of 
the others in making the adjustment 
which the court deems just and equitable 
between the parties. This is also true 
of the relative guilt, or perhaps hetter 
stated, the greater responsibility one 
spouse may appear to have than the other 
for bringing about the failure of the 
marriage." 
o. The Trial court Abused rts Discretion. 
There is a distinction between the division of 
assets accumulated during the marriage, which should be 
distributed on an equitable basis, 11 and the postmarital 
duty of support and maintenance. Alimony is a perpetual 
lien on the husband's future income, income acquired in 
the absence of the wife and without her assistance. 
"The question whether permanent 
alimony shall be allowed is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and a principal reason why the 
court has such a discretion is that 
there are several factors which may 
justify it in denying alimony altcigether, 
11. where the wife assisted in the accumulation, either 
directly or indirectly. 
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such as the misconduct of the wife 
tile-financial condition--Of"-the parties, 
and contractual agreements between the 
parties regarding alimony." Se8: 24 Am 
,Jur 2u, "Divorce and separation," section 
618, page 740 (Emphasis supplied). 
The Trial court permitted no independent evi-
dence from those who knew, relating to marital fault or 
misconduct. The evidence the court heard on the issue of 
misconduct, was received because it was not objected to, 
because the subject matter was opened on direct by Plain-
tiff's own counsel or because, in the Trial court's opinion, 
it related to grounds. 
The Trial court considered economic factors and 
excluded considerations of marital fault and misconduct. 
And, it made the assumption that the law of this juris-
diction required such emphasis and such exclusion. In 
determining then, whether permanent alimony should be 
allowed, and also, if so, its extent and duration; in exer-
cising, in other words, its discretion in that regard, the 
court did not consider the factors required to invoke such 
a discretion in the first instance. 
"The nature of the misconduct of 
the wife is for consideration as an aid 
to judicial discretion in deciding 
whether the wife should have alimony on 12 divorce, and, if so, the amount thereof." 
12. Alldredge, supra at 685, citing cronin v. cronin 
245 Ala.309, 16 SQ.2d 714. 
-31-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Trial court abused its discretion. 
induced to do so by a misapprehension of the law. 
It ,,,1as 
This 
court will disturb the findings of the Trial court, 
and 
its judgment, where it has abused its discret:i.'on or 
mis-
applied principles of law. Eastman v. Eastman (Utah, 197, 
558 p.2d 514, carter v. carter (Utah, 1977) 563 P.2d l77, 
Watson v. watson (Utah, 1977) 561 P.2d 1072. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED THE TESTIMONY OF DEF::;:. 
ANT'S WITNESSES. 
The Trial court excluded the testimony of Andre 
George, Manny Hasoppe and Arlette Rukavina. They were 
the sister, brother and daughter of the Plaintiff, respec· 
tively. All were to testify in behalf of the Defendant, 
Andre Gramme. The Trial court, which indulged every liber· 
ality respecting the financial witnesses, permitted no 
' h ' 1 f 13 ' independent testimony concerning t e mar:i. ta acts. Jc 
heard, relative to such matters, from the plaintiff and 
the Defendant, exclusively. 
The exclusion of testimony basic to the Defend· 
ant's case was supported, the Trial court claimed, by t~ 
provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Evidence (R. 528, 534 
13. The court reluctantly permitted testimony from oe:~/· 
cal lister, the chief arson investigator for the salt L 
City Fire Department (R. 482). 
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~he cestimony, the court argued, would be cumulative or 
corroborative and would·necessitate an undue consumption 
of time. It would create a substantial danger of impair-
ing relationships buyond those that existed between the 
plaintiff and the Defendant, 14 and the probative value of 
such testimony was outweighed, it said, by those factors 
(R. 528, 529). 
rn a case involving hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, the Trial court listened to the partisans and 
rejected the independent testimony of those who knew the 
principals best. Mrs. George was the only sister of the 
plaintiff, and Mr. Hasoppe the only brother. Mrs. Rukavina 
v1as the adult daughter and only child of the parties to 
these proceedings. All were familiar with facts germane 
co the litigation.ls 
14. While excluding the evidence professing concern that 
the testimony of the family members would "create a sub-
stantial danger" of impairing relationships beyond those 
of the plaintiff and Defendant (R. 528), the Trial court 
coerced, in every sense contrary to that concern, a proffer 
of proof in open court respecting the anticipated testi-
mony (R. 528-531)-:---oefendant's counsel requested, at the 
outset of the trial, in chambers, that the testimony of 
the three witnesses be taken out of the presence of the 
parties, asserting that practice in the Third District had 
permitted such an exclusion on a prior occasion. 
15. The discussion concerning the testimony of the ex-
cluded witnesses is on the record at pages 522 through 
535, and the plaintiff's proffer of proof for Mrs. George 
begins at page 531. 
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August 3, 1977, and ch& Plaintiff rested, ( ?. · ·-Vi~, 4G: 
sometime in tl1e afternoon on C.!Onday, M.uc;usi 8, Ll~~ °' 
I ... ~ -
some three and one-half days of tria1. 16 T~;0 Defcr.da:.: 
direct case began on ~onday afternoon and was concl~d~ 
the early afternoon on Tuesday, August 9, taking one i~. 
The Plaintiff called a rebuttal witness on Wednesday, 
August 9, and August 10, was reserved in its entiretc'· ... 
argument and plaintiff's testimony on attorney's fees. 
The most cursory analysis of Rule 45 should 
serve to indicate that its provisions were not proper~ 
applied in this instance. The admission of such testimo; 
could not "unfairly or harmfully" surprise the plaintif:. 
The intention of the Defendant to call such witnesses was 
disclosed to the plaintiff in Defendant's Answers to 
plaintiff's Interrogatories filed with the court rou~~ 
five months in advance of the trial (Pleadings, R. 37). 
NO one could claim that the testimony of the excluded w::-
nesses, in a trial to the court sitting without a jury, 
created any substantial danger of undue prejudice or of 
confusing the issues, or of misleading any jury. rt can 
scarcely be argued in a case of such importance, that the 
16. The Defendant concedes thac the cross-exaroin~t~on of 
the plaintiff, and of the financial witness, franK ~· 
stuart, was substantial. 
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2 :<pec:ed ::o cake 
11
'is mi-nutes to an hour 11 (R. 531), would 
:cs~l~ in :he undue consumption of time. The fact that the 
~~=~esses wcr~ r~lated by blood or marriage, or by birth, 
:o s:1e ?a::: ties, was not an element for consideration under 
the rule, and constituted no reason for invoking a rule of 
exclusion under the circumstances of this case. 
The Trial Court initiated the challenge to the 
:estimony of ;qrs. George, on its own motion (R. 522). rts 
action in refusing to permit independent testimony relative 
co marital fault or misconduct was, counsel avers, predi-
cated upon a misconception of the applicable law.17 
The witnesses were prepared to testify, contrary 
co expectations, in favor of a relative by marriage and 
in opposition to a relative by blood. 18 such testimony 
~as an inherent kind of authenticity. rt was legal error 
for the Trial court, in exercising its control over the 
:1ow of evidence, to depriv~ the Trial court, as the finder 
of the facts, from hearing and considering such testimony. 
That is particularly true where, as here, the fact finder 
is to determine where the truth lies as between principals 
17. See legal discussion, this Brief, Point I. 
18. With the exception of Arlette Rukavina who was the 
~atJral daughter of the plaintiff and the Defendant. 
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who are partisan regarding facts that are ~ontr ~ averted. 
such determinations are difficult at best as th' 
' is Cour: 
has frequentl:/ recognized, " ... because judqcs, being huwa· 
ca!'not pcnctr.:lte the family drama with complete under-
standing. "19 
So long as facts testified to by a party are r.o: 
conclusively established or admitted, they are open to 
further proof, and it is error to exclude evidence on t~ 
ground that it is cumulative. Evans v. Industrial Acciden: 
commission 71 cal. App 2d 244, 162 P.2d 488, Conlee v. 
Taylor 153 Tenn. 507, 285 s.w. 35, 48 ALR 940, Traders a~ 
General Insurance company v. Russell (Tex. Civ. App.) 99 
s.w. 2d 1079. rt is generally held that the erroneous 
exclusion of evidence affects a substantial right requirir.; 
reversal if the evidence in question related to a material 
point in issue, seneris v. Haas 45 cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 
915, 53 ALR 2d 124, and that it may not be disregarded by 
an appellate court even though it may approve of the ver-
diet. people v. Alex 260 N.Y. 425, 183 N.E. 906, 85 ALR 
939. 
nesses, 
The Defendant was entitled to present his wit· 
the admission of whose testimony would have added 
19. Alldredge v. Alldredge 119 Utah 504, 229 p.2d 681, 
34 ALR 2d 305. 
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materially to the weight and clarity of the evidence. The 
power of the Court to c~ntrol the introduction of evidence 
at a civil trial must be exercised cautiously and so as 
not to impair the rights of the parties. The court must 
exercise a sounu judicial discretion in the context of the 
special circumstances of the particular case. The exclu-
sion, in this case, of all independent testimony of mari-
tal fault or misconduct, and of other substantive matters 
known to these primary witnesses, was arbitrary and unreason-
ably r~strictive. 
The exclusion of the preferred testimony resulted 
from a misunderstanding and misapplication of the law. It 
was an abuse of discretion and constituted, where the 
Defendant was concerned, a manifest injustice. Those are 
grounds, under long established principles of our law, for 
the modification or reversal, on appeal, of the Trial court's 
findings. watson v. watson (Utah, 1977) 561 p.2d 1072, 
Harding v. Harding 26 Utah 2d 277, 488 P.2d 308, Martinett v. 
Martinett 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 p.2d 821. 
POINT III 
THE DECREE WAS INEQUITABLE AND REQUIRES REVISION 
A. The Allocation of the property and the Award 
of Alimony in the proceedings Below was out of Proportion 
to the Wife's Contribution to the Accumulation of the 
Marital Estate. 
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The Plaintiff told the Defendant t' 
nat she was 
"a very expensive 1vomar.-" and admitted that h 
s e had said 
that the only thing she knew how to do was d spen monGy 
(R. 168). During the period when the estate of the par~:,, 
was essentially accumulated, the Plaintiff was totallv 
unemployed. The maximum rate of pay the Plaintiff ev~ 
received from any employment was $2. 05 per hour (R. 224). 
The Plaintiff had household help for ten or twelve years, 
in fact as early as 1964 or 1965, to assist her in caring 
for the duplex on Cortez Street (R. 214). From early 1969 
till sept ember of 1976, and to January of 1977, when she 
moved to california, the Plaintiff stayed at home, (R. 2li, 
216) as previously described. During that period of ti~ 
there were incidents at cortez which operated to frustrate 
the Defendant's business efforts, to occupy his time, dim1:.· 
ish his resources, and to impede and frustrate the acquisi· 
tion of the estate. 
The plaintiff brought essentially nothing to the 
marriage, neither property nor educational or employment 
skills (R. 173-175). she was able, physically, to attack 
Mrs. Morecraft, a much younger woman, at the airport. she 
The has, presently, no serious physical impediments. 
plaintiff had a single child, Mrs. Rukavina, the prospec· 
d The plaintiif tive witness, who was long ago emancipate . 
has not managed her own home or handled the household 
-38-
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Jccounts ~nd has diminisheJ the parties estate, through her 
spending habits, and b~ her misconduct. 
The allowance of permanent alimo0y normally pre-
sumes that the wife assisted in the accumulation of the 
property and that she should receive a just proportion of 
what she has helped to earn, and that alimony should not 
be awarded where she did not materially assist her husband 
in the home or out. Wilkins v. Wilkins 84 Neb. 206, 120 
N.W. 907. see: Annotation: 34 ALR 2d 337, section 8. 
This court in the early case of Blair v. Blair 40 utah 306, 
121 p. 19, determined that the size and productiveness of 
the estate of the husband, while an important factor in 
determining the amount of the allowance, must not be con-
sidered without reference to whether or not the wife was 
of assistance to him in accumulating the property. 
rt was precisely during the years of the Plain-
tiff's dormancy, that the Defendant changed from an employee 
working for others, to the owner of his own business, bid-
ding on jobs and substantially increasing his net worth. 
The Plaintiff has been a hindrance, rather than an aid, in 
the accumulation of the assets which the Trial court dis-
tributed in allocating the property. The estate was 
accumulated by the diligence of the Defendant in spite of 
the Plaintiff's habits, in the face of her instability and 
despite her lack of industry and thrift. 
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Divorce proceedi11gs are in equity and this Couc, 
on appeal, can review q~estions of both law and fact. 
King v. King 25 Utah 2d 163, 478 p.2d 492. l\ 1 though the 
judgment of the 'l'riul court will not b d. 
- e isturbcd light!;, 
this Court may review the evidence, make its own find· in gs 
and substitute .its judgment for that of the Trial court 
when justice requires. Harding v. Harding 26 utah 2d 277 , 
488 P. 2d 308, Dearden v. Dearden 15 utah 2d 105, 388 P.ld 
230, Martinett v. Martinett B utah 2d 202, 331 p.2d 821, 
Wilson v. Wilson 5 utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977. 
B. The Distribution of the Property as ordered 
by the Trial court Made the Present Award of substantial 
permanent Alimony unnecessary. 
The Trial court awarded the plaintiff assets tha: 
plaintiff's own counsel valued at $197,500.00, 20 without 
including the household furniture and furnishings in carmel, 
California, the miscellaneous personal property included lr. 
Exhibit 25-p, attorneys fees of $8,000.00 (R. 132) or court 
costs in the amount of $298. 70. The award included a 
savings certificate in the amount of $25, 000. 00 at the 
Silver King state Bank in park City, Utah, which was fully 
encumbered.and it required that the Defendant whose 
liquidity and prospects were described upon the record ~ 
20. Exhibit 66-P 
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considerable detail, should "forthwith" make all arrange-
ments required to release the encumbrances against the 
~crtificatc (lz. 131). The Defendant, valurd the property 
aw~~dcd to the Plaintiff, in the provisions of the Decree, 
at very close to $213,800.00, including the attorneys fees 
and costs. 21 
The parties had acqui~ed the home in carmel, 
california, only slightly more than a year prior to their 
separation. It cost $130,000.00, originally, and was valued 
at $167,500.00, when the case was tried (R. 600. see also: 
plaintiff's Exhibit 55-p) and its value, of course, con-
tinues to increase. There is no encumbrance against the 
carmel property. The home in carmel was awarded to the 
plaintiff and the duplex on Cortez Street was awarded to 
the Defendant (R. 131). In addition, then, to the award of 
over $200,000.00 in property to the plaintiff, the court 
granted the Plaintiff, presumably as a substitute for a 
right of support, alimony in the sum of $1,400.00 per month, 
which projected over a fifteen year period, less than the 
life expectancy of the Plaintiff, amounts to an additional 
$252,000.00. In that regard, the oecree works such an in-
justice to the Defendant, that equity and conscience demand 
21. Exhibit 34-D. 
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that it be revised. Christensen v. Chris~ensen 2l 
263, 444 p.2d 511. 
The question whether permanent alimony shoub 
allowed must consi::ler the underlying necessities of tne 
wife and the financial ability of the husband. The wife': 
income, and counsel suggests her prospective income, fro:. 
her separate estate, is always a factor in determini~~ 
allowance of alimony and may constitute an absolute b~ 
where it is amply sufficient to maintain her in that pos:-
tion in life to which she has been accustomed. ~· 
Miles 185 Or. 230, 202 P.2d 485. 
If one subtracted from, say, $200,000.00, the 
conservative value of t.he court's property award to the 
plaintiff, the sum of $36,350.00, the net equity in the 
parties long term home at 692 Cortez Street in Salt Lake 
City, utah, the plaintiff would retain a cash balance oi 
$163,650.00. That is to say that if the plaintiff put H 
another home a value equivalent to the value of the home:: 
which she and the Defendant had, essentially, for the per::: 
of the marriage, lived, she could free up, or make liquid, 
easily, in excess of $150,000.00. That equation does not 
consider the increased value of the carmel home, and must 
be considered conservative. 
At 7 1/2%, a normal trus•~ r, .. c• , such a fund 
would produce without touching the principal, for the 
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plaintiff, $11, 250.00 annually, or at 8%, $12,000.00, or 
at 10'.'0, $15,000.00. 
In MacDonald v. Macoonald 120 Utah 573, 236 p.2d 
1066, the parties had been married for 29 years, about the 
same time as the parties on this appeal. They had one 
child, an adult, as do these parties. The problem of the 
wife in MacDonald was not drugs and emotional instability, 
as here, but rather intoxicating liquor and emotional 
instability. Where the drinking had gone to such an excess 
as to present a considerable family problem, where as 
Justice Crockett said, there was nothing for the court to 
do except to recognize the failure and "pronounce a bene-
diction on the wreck," the Trial court awarded only nominal 
alimony and this court with its extensive scope of review, 
affirmed. 
The court held that the cash awarded to the wife, 
though in that case her own, was "properly taken in account 
in appraising the entire financial situation of the parties 
and adjusting their property rights." under those circum-
stances, this court said, based as they were upon the condi-
tions which existed at the time of the divorce there was 
no necessity that the wife be paid substantial alimony 
immediately. There is no such necessity in the instant case. 
Although in Macoonald the court is affirming what a Trial 
Court had earlier done, in contradiction to the ~ituation 
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here, the underlying equitable considerations remain•'. 
'-!'.';: 
same. MacDonald stands for the proposition that th 
e Tr1a 
court must take into account the resources of the wife, 
including the property awarded to her in the divorce Pro-
ceeding, in determining the liability for alimony. 
rn Dubois v. Dubois 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d lle: 
(1973), the Trial court took into account the source of::, 
assets which comprised the marital estate and also the 
fact that the Plaintiff wife was, unlike our case, without 
fault in the termination of the marriage. "However, " th10 
court said, "it appears that the income from the assets 
awarded to the plaintiff is sufficient to maintain her i~ 
the manner to which she is accustomed without periodic pay· 
men ts from the Defendant." The court permitted the alimo:: 
to be modified to reduce the payments to the sum of $1.00 
per year. rn that case, there was a 30 year marriage, two 
children were over 21 years of age and the Defendant hu~ 
band had informed his wife that he was in love with another 
woman. 
At 7 1/2°/o, a normal trust return, the sum of 
$150,000.00 paid at the rate of $1,400.00 per month w~~ 
last the plaintiff, without any additional assistance from 
d t hs The sum the Defendant, for fourteen years an ten man -
of $175,000.00 would pay $1.400.00 per month for over twe.: 
years. 
· t the t;me of paymc"t At a higher rate of interes , ~ 
would, of course, be increased. 
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c. The Award of Alimony was Inequitable. 
In Febru~ry, ~977, during the pendency of these 
proceedings b~fore the Trial court, the Plaintiff was 
arrested and incarcerated on the felony charge in carmel, 
california, which involved the theft of jewelry from her 
carmel neighbors. The Defendant, who was called by the 
plaintiff, who was in jail, travelled to California with 
Mrs. Hasoppe, the mother of the Plaintiff, in an effort to 
assist her (R. 459). On that occasion, after the release 
of the plaintiff, the Defendant became suspicious, he 
testified, of the relationship between his then estranged 
and separated wife and a deputy sheriff in Monterey county, 
named Wilbur House, (R. 459) who the plaintiff admitted she 
had first met as early as Memorial oay 1975, approximately 
the same time the carmel home was purchased (R. 284). 
The Defendant travelled a second time to carmel, 
California, in April of 1977 (R. 458), while the Plaintiff 
was in utah in connection with these proceedings. He 
entered the carmel home and found a message on the kitchen 
telephone to Mr. House, written presumably by a gardener,· 
Mr. Arriola (R. 461). Another message was found on the 
telephone in a bedroom that had been converted to a TV 
room, written by Mrs. Gramme, who testified it was for 
the gardener (R. 289). rt is in evidence as Defendant's 
Exhibit 35-o. 
-45-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On the occasion of the April visit, the Defonda:. 
found mens clothing in the bedroom closet which included 
four suits, a pair of gray slacks, two sports outfits, a 
sweater, two wool'-"n golf shirts, some dress shirts, socks, 
ties and underwear (R. 462). The Defendant estimated the 
value of the clothing at six to eight hundred dollars 
(R. 463, 464) and took as evidence, the gray corduroy sui:, 
which was tailored and had been worn, one or two of the go~' 
shirts, the ties, socks and underwear. The other items o: 
clothing were left in the home (R. 463, 464) . The Trial 
court refused the admission of the i-t:ems of clothing in 
22 
evidence (R. 470, 471), although they were described in 
some d~tail by the Defendant on the record (R. 463). T~ 
plaintiff admitted there was clothing in the home, but 
claimed that it was new clothing and that it had never bm 
worn. rt was, she said, "I guess, my mistake, because you 
hang me with it ... " (R. 286). Mrs. Gramme admitted, that 
one suit, four shirts, two ties and some socks were taken 
(R. 286). The plaintiff admitted only the items of mens 
clothing she knew to be in the Defendant's physical posses· 
sion and conceded that they belonged to Mr. House (R. 2SS). 
The Defendant testified there were many other items, incld· 
ing three suits, that were left behind (R. 463). The 
22. And also refused the admission of a letter that made 
reference to Mr. House (R. 290-293). 
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plaintiff's explanation of these events is on the record 
at 286, 287. 
Mrs. cranunc, who admitted that hor sole source 
of income was th~ temporary alimony payment she received 
from the oefendant (R. 296), admitted that she had spent 
$125.00 or $126.00 on clothing for Mr. House (R. 287) and 
the record showed that between March 19 and May 23, 1977, 
she had written to a store called Bruhns, where the clothes 
for Mr. House were purchased, ten checks totalling $980.14 
(R. 294). She claimed that the greater part of the pur-
chases were for herself. 
The plaintiff also admitted that she had given 
Mr. House, in addition to the clothing, over essentially 
the same time period, checks in the total amount of $800.00 
which, she claimed, were for services the deputy sheriff 
performed in and around the Carmel home, and for goods 
furnished for the home (R. 287, 288). 
When Mr. Gramme arrived, he found that Mr. House, 
who was married and whose wife, the Plaintiff testified, 
had terminal cancer (R. 285), had control of the keys to 
his boat and possession of his tools which had been removed 
from the garage of the carmel home (R. 465, 466). Dis-
cussions with Mrs. House, and one with Mr. House at the 
marina are detailed in the record beginning at page 465. 
Barely 45 minutes after the conversation at the marina with 
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Mr. House, the Defendant returned to the carmel h 
ome 1vhers 
he found that the mens clothes not previously taken had 
been removed, along with the note on the kitchen tel h 
ep onE 
(R. 466, 467). 
After a divorce is granted, it is clear that the 
affections of the parties may rest and re os l P e w iere they 
will. one thing, however, is certain. The Defendant has 
never had an obligation to support, in any fashion, anyone 
other than the Plaintiff, or to provide any third p~~ 
with cash and clothing, to'ols, a boat and access to a 
$170,000.00 home. 
rt is inequitable to require that the Defendant 
furnish such assistance, especially, where the wife has 
been provided in the allocation of the marital estate, ~tl 
resources sufficient for her own support. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND cc:: 
section 30-3-3 u.c.A. 1953, permits an award to 
the wife, or to a husband, of money with which to prosecute, 
or defend, an action in divorce. The Statute, this court 
has said, does not contemplate that the award for expenses 
of the litigation should be made only in those cases where 
the adverse party, usually the wife, is destitute or 
practically so, but rather when, in the sound discretion 
of the court, the circumstances of the parties are such 
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that in fairness to the wife she should be given financial 
assistance by the husb~nd in her prosecution or defense 
of the action. sec: Weiss v. Weiss 111 utah 353, 179 P.2d 
1005. 
The financial circumstances of the parties have 
an important bearing on issues relative to attorneys fees 
and suit money, and are critical to the determination of 
the amount of, or the necessity for, their award. 
"The reason for permitting a wife 
suit money to defend an action for 
divorce rests on the ground that the 
wife normally has no separate estate 
from which to pay for bringing or 
defending the action. This is the 
situation in the case at hand." Alldredge v. 
Alldredge 119 Utah 504, 229 p.2d 681. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Not to allow the wife expenses and counsel fees, 
Justice Wolfe said, would in the majority of cases work 
an injustice by deny.ing her the power to enforce any 
marital rights she might have. In the instant case, how-
ever, the normal situation does not apply. The wife was 
not only granted $8,000.00 in attorneys fees, together 
with costs of approximately $300.00, but was given, at the 
same time, as her sole and separate estate, real and 
personal property worth in excess of $200,000.00, and 
increasing in value. 
under circumstances where the wife did not 
require, "in fairness, " the financial assistance of the 
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husband to insure the efficient presentation f 
o her Sid, 
of the controversy, this court has said, 
"We L!l:.;o believe thuL the cvL-
dcnce shows Lhilt the Pluint~ff hus a 
suffici0nt income from property owned 
by her to justify the court's ruling 
that defendant should not be required 
to pay her attorney fees and costs in 
these proceedings." Callister v. 
Callister 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 p.2d 944. 
There was no necessity for the award of fees 
and costs under the circumstances of this case, and it 
is not equitable that the Defendant should be required 
to pay them from his share of the marital estate. 
Beyond, however, the economic considerations 
raised above, this court has previously considered the 
implications of misconduct on attorney's fees and costs. 
"Here (concerning suit money), as 
in the case of alimony, gross or irrunoral 
conduct rna1 cause a denial of attorney 
fees, ..... 2 Alldredge, supra at 687. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial court was obliged to render an equit· 
able adjustment of the economic resources of the parties, 
and to help them reconstruct their li•Jes on a happy and 
23. "Most jurisdictions" provide that the court ma~ 
deny suit money to a wife who is guilty of matrimonial 
misconduct sufficient to authorize the husband to sue 3 for a divorce or separation. Annotation: 2 ALR 2d 31 ' 
section 3. see also: 24 Arn Jur 2d, "Divorce and 
separation," section 596, p. 720. 
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useful basis. In doing so, however, it was necessary for 
the court to consider relative guilt or innocence. 
The Trial court misread the flexible standard 
established by tliis court, and misapplied the law. rt is 
true that many of the elements to be considered in making 
an award of alimony are of economic character. rt was 
erroneous to assume, however, that the economic elements 
were exclusive. The award was an injustice to the Defend-
ant who is both a casualty of the plaintiff's conduct, which 
made the continuation of the marriage irnpossible, 24 and a 
victim of social engineering. 
The plaintiff, as a condition of the divorce, 
acquired an estate worth approximately $200,000.00, far in 
excess of the plaintiff's contributions, personal or 
financial, to the accumulation of the estate, and an ex-
pectancy of several hundred thousand more. The allocation 
of the property and the plaintiff's economic independence 
made the award of permanent alimony unnecessary. rt is 
inconceivable that the plaintiff, who spent virtually her 
entire married life in a duplex that cost less than 
$10,000.00 initially to build, should now reside in a 
home that was, at the time of the trial, worth $170,000.00, 
on which the taxes and insurance are approximately 
24. And his own conduct predictable. 
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$3,000.00 per year. It is entirely improbable tha.t a per. 
son with the Plaintiff' :5 emotional and financial histor" 
,, 
can successfully manage such an estate without assis-
tance. 25 rn orde.c to avoid economic dependence or the 
misuse of assets, the wise and efficient management of 
the Plaintiff's substantial estate, under the circumstanceo 
of this case, is an utter necessity. The assets, if 
liquidated and wisely managed, are adequate and suff~~m 
for the Plaintiff's needs. The home in carmel should be 
sold and another acquired. The proceeds should be placed 
in trust for the benefit of a Plaintiff who is both vul-
nerable, and psychologically unstable. 
This court should eliminate altogether, or sub· 
st an tially reduce, the alimony award. It should order 
the sale of the carmel home and require that the liquidatE·i 
proceeds be professionally managed for the plaintiff's 
benefit, and protection. The court should diminish ~e 
property award to the extent of the savings certificate, 
$ 25, 000. 00, which is encumbered, and require the plaintiff 
25. see Defendant's Final Argument, at 627 to 629, for 
a discussion of the considerations involved here. 
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to pay from her court awarded share of the marital estate, 
her own attorneys fees ~nd costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOEL M. ALLRED 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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